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INTRODUCTION 
Private capital and technology play a central role in the 
transition to a low-carbon economy.1 In the absence of an 
international carbon price, the regulatory initiatives currently 
used to stimulate the participation of private investors in this 
transition are primarily directed at influencing the incomes of 
investments. At the national level, states create support schemes 
to enable the financial viability of low-carbon investments, such 
as renewable energy projects, energy efficiency improvements, 
and carbon capture and storage.2 At an international level, the 
flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol3—the Joint 
Implementation (“JI”) and Clean Development Mechanism 
(“CDM”)—provide low-carbon investors with an additional 
income to cover the higher costs of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emission reduction projects that would, in theory, not have been 
realized without this support. Moreover, at national and 
regional levels, emissions trading schemes positively influence 
the financial viability of low-carbon investments by capping and 
trading GHG emissions.4 
 The potential costs and revenues of a project, however, are 
not the only considerations taken into account by investors. 
Investment decisions are also influenced by risks of ex post 
regulatory changes or interference by the state. Due to the 
dependence on public support and other regulatory structures 
that states create to internalize the carbon externality, low-
carbon investments are particularly vulnerable to regulatory 
risks. Given the financial consequences of support policies for 
the state budget and consumers, states may be tempted to 
renege on promises of public support once the investments have 
                                                                                                             
1. See Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change, at 42 (2007). 
2. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, at 295–96, 299 
(2010) [hereinafter IEA]. 
3. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
4. See, e.g., Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the 
Community and Amending Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. L 275/32. 
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been made and costs are “sunk.”5 A perception amongst low-
carbon investors that the state might act opportunistically and 
change the “rules of the game” requires them to factor in a risk 
premium. Taking into account long-term and capital-intensive 
nature of most low-carbon investments, it is reasonable to 
assume that this perception of ex post public interference with 
the financial basis of low-carbon investments will increase the 
cost of climate policies. By contrast, economic and financial 
theory would suggest that a guarantee of protection against 
these risks may reduce the required returns and thus stimulate 
these investments.6 
The focus on the “‘income-side” of low-carbon investments 
has taken attention away from the importance of the “risk-side” 
of these investments. This contribution builds upon the idea 
that, to promote low-carbon investments, “mitigating risk is 
certainly an alternative to raising the level of compensation.”7 
To be efficient, climate regulations need to be compatible with 
the way private investors make their investment decisions and 
must therefore reflect both the income and risk components of 
low-carbon investments. 
Despite the considerable importance of regulatory risks for 
low-carbon investments, legal literature largely remains silent on 
how to best protect low-carbon investors against the occurrence 
of these risks. The debate on the interaction between investment 
arbitration and climate law, for instance, almost exclusively 
focuses on the potential constraining effect (“regulatory chill”) 
that investment standards might have on states intending to 
implement GHG emission reduction policies.8 The role that 
                                                                                                             
5. See Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn & Richard Mash, Credible Carbon Policy, 19 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 438, 439–42 (2003). 
6. See Catherine Mitchell, Dierk Bauknecht & Peter M. Connor, Effectiveness 
through Risk Reduction: A Comparison of the Renewable Obligation in England and Wales and 
the Feed-in System in Germany, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 297, 297 (2006); see also Dominique 
Finon & Yannick Perez, The Social Efficiency of Instruments of Promotion of Renewable 
Energies: A Transaction-cost Perspective, 62 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 77, 81, 86 (2007). On the 
importance of regulatory stability and predictability for climate policies, see NICHOLAS 
STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 325 (2006). 
7. See Mitchell, Bauknecht & Connor, supra note 6, at 297 (quoting OLE LANGNISS 
& PETER HELBY, FINANCING RENEWABLE ENERGY SYSTEMS 112 (1999)). 
8. See, e.g., Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Markus Gehring, Trade and 
Investment Implication of Carbon Trading for Sustainable Development, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND 77, 88 (David Freestone & 
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investment arbitration might play in reinforcing climate change 
mitigation policies (i.e. investment arbitration as a “force for 
good”) is only mentioned en passant.9 
This Article examines whether investment arbitration could 
complement the existing income-based approach of climate 
policies with a risk-based approach and thus reinforce the 
credibility and effectiveness of climate change mitigation efforts. 
Indeed, international investment agreements (“IIAs”) aim to 
protect foreign investors against public interference with the 
financial and regulatory basis of their investments.10 
International investment law is based on the necessity to reduce 
noncommercial regulatory and political risks in order to 
promote the inflow of foreign capital and technology.11 The 
substantive investment standards that are generally contained in 
IIAs include protection against expropriation, the provision of 
fair and equitable treatment, and nondiscrimination and 
umbrella (pacta sunt servanda) clauses. Are these international 
investment protection standards capable of shielding low-carbon 
investments against substantial change by host states in terms of 
the support mechanisms that they create to attract such 
                                                                                                             
Charlotte Streck eds., 2009); Lise Johnson, International Investment Agreements and 
Climate Change: The Potential for Investor-State Conflicts and Possible Strategies for Minimizing 
It, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11147, 11150, 11153 (2009); Stephan W. Schill, Do Investment 
Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to Mitigate Climate Change?, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 469, 
470, 477 (2007); JACOB WERKSMAN, KEVIN A. BAUMERT & NAVROZ K. DUBASH, WORLD 
RESOURCES INST., WILL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT RULES OBSTRUCT CLIMATE 
PROTECTION POLICIES? 9 (2001), available at http://www.wri.org/publication/will-
international-investment-rules-obstruct-climate-protection-policies; Kate Miles, 
International Investment Law and Climate Change: Issues in the Transition to a Low Carbon 
World 10, 22–25 (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. L., Online Proceedings of the Inaugural 
Conference, Working Paper No. 27/08, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
 sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154588. 
9. See Schill, supra note 8, at 477; see also FIONA MARSHALL, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: 
OBSTACLES OR OPPORTUNITIES? 23–25, 79 (2010); Bradford S. Gentry & Jennifer J. 
Ronk, International Investment Agreements and Investments in Renewable Energy, in FROM 
BARRIERS TO OPPORTUNITIES: RENEWABLE ENERGY ISSUES IN LAW AND POLICY 25, 71–73 
(Leslie Parker et al. eds., 2007). But see Edna Sussman, The Energy Charter Treaty’s 
Investor Protection Provisions: Potential to Foster Solutions to Global Warming and Promote 
Sustainable Development, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 391, 404 (2008). 
10. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW passim (2008). 
11. See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND 
RELATED DOCUMENTS: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
COOPERATION 14 (2004). 
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investment? The answer to this question will determine the 
ability of international investment law to contribute to the 
international efforts required to combat climate change.12 
In Part I, this Article briefly recalls the main regulatory 
principles underlying the support mechanisms that states 
develop to attract low-carbon investments and by highlighting 
how states may interfere with promised support. Part II looks at 
the regulatory risks in light of current arbitral practice. Whether 
low-carbon investments would answer to the definition of 
“investments” under international investment law is questioned 
in Part II.A. Part II.B then analyzes the expropriation standard, 
Part II.C considers the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
Part II.D looks at the nondiscrimination principle, and Part II.E 
examines umbrella clauses. Finally, Part II.F analyzes the extent 
to which states could justify possible breaches of these 
investment protection standards on the basis of public policy 
objectives. Given that most GHG emission reductions will have 
to take place in the energy sector, special attention is paid 
throughout this Article to the energy-specific investment regime 
of the Energy Charter Treaty.13 
This Article demonstrates that investment arbitration 
provides the necessary conceptual tools required to improve the 
regulatory stability and predictability that is necessary for low-
carbon investment. It has the potential to protect low-carbon 
investments against the risks of regulatory changes that can 
affect climate policies. By providing these guarantees of stability, 
investment arbitration can reinforce the credibility of climate 
change mitigation policies. However, in the absence of a 
doctrine of precedent in international investment law, low-
carbon investors have no certainty that arbitral tribunals will 
follow an interpretative approach that adequately protects their 
                                                                                                             
12. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTMENT OF 
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY REGARDING THE 
MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: ANNEXES (2009) (statement of Alan Larson), 
availabel at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2009/131118.htm. For a general 
discussion on the positive contribution of investment arbitration to environmental 
goals, see Thomas Wälde, Investment Arbitration and Sustainable Development: Good 
Intentions—or Effective Results?, 6 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 459, 460–62 (2006). 
13. Energy Charter Treaty, 1994 O.J. L 380/24 [hereinafter Energy Charter 
Treaty].  
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investments. It is precisely this certainty that is needed to reduce 
the costs of climate change mitigation policies. 
Following the reasoning underlying the Energy Charter 
Treaty, this Article examines the idea of creating a specific 
investment treaty for climate change mitigation projects in Part 
III. In Part IV, this Article proposes to integrate a low-carbon 
specific investment protection regime in a new international 
agreement on climate change. This approach would not require 
the development of new investment disciplines, but could be 
limited to an official endorsement of existing interpretative 
approaches. 
I. REGULATORY RISKS IN CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
POLICIES14 
A. Risks in the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
The CDM, defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
refers to the implementation of project activities that reduce 
GHG emissions by Annex I parties (i.e. states with GHG 
emission limits) or by subordinate legal entities in non-Annex I 
parties.15 The emission credits generated by such projects are 
known as Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”) and can be 
used by Annex I parties to meet their emission reduction 
targets.16 CDM project activities thus promote the transfer of 
low-carbon technologies from industrialized countries to 
developing countries.17 
The CDM is supervised by the CDM Executive Board.18 This 
international institution approves CDM projects and issues CERs 
in accordance with the following procedure.19 First, since 
                                                                                                             
14. This Part draws on Anatole Boute, The Potential Contribution of International 
Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate Change, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 
333, 341–46 (2009). 
15. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 12; see Maria Netto & Kai-Uwe Barani 
Schmidt, CDM Project Cycle and the Role of the UNFCCC Secretariat, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 175, 175 
(David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2005). 
16. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 12(3)(b). 
17. See Netto & Barani Schmidt, supra note 15, at 175. 
18. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 12(4). 
19. See U.N. Envtl. Programme, CDM Information and Guidebook, at 48–49 (Myung-
Kyoon Lee ed., 2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.cd4cdm.org/Publications/ cdm%
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participation in the CDM is voluntary, host states, as well as 
home countries, have to endorse the project.20 States, the 
Designated National Authority (“DNA”) in particular, generally 
approve projects by signing so-called Letters of Approval.21 
Second, the project participants have to prepare a Project 
Design Document (“PDD”) outlining the technical design of the 
project activity and determining its “additionality”22 in 
comparison to what would occur without the project (“Business 
as Usual”). The PDD has to be approved by a Designated 
Operational Entity (“DOE”).23 Third, after being validated by a 
DOE, the proposed project activity must be submitted for 
registration by the CDM Executive Board.24 Once registered, the 
project activity can be implemented and can begin to generate 
emission reductions. Emissions reductions are calculated in 
relation to a baseline representing the emissions that would 
occur in a Business as Usual scenario. A DOE must 
independently control the monitoring of the project activity and 
certify the amount of emission reductions achieved. On the basis 
of this certification, the CDM Executive Board issues a 
corresponding amount of CERs. 
JI, defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, refers to the 
implementation by Annex I parties, or its legal entities, of 
                                                                                                             
20guideline%202nd%20edition.pdf; see also Kati Kulovesi, The Private Sector and the 
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Experiences, Challenges and Prospects, 16 REV. EUR. 
COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 145, 147–48, 150–52 (2007); SIDS CDM Guide–The CDM: 
Practical Details, FOUND. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L. & DEV., http://www.cdmguide.net/
cdm10.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). For an overview of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (“CDM”) project cycle, see Netto & Barani Schmidt, supra note 15, at 186–
90. 
20. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol, 1st Sess., Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, Modalities and Procedures for a Clean 
Development Mechanism as Defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, at 15, Decision 
3/CMP.1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter 
Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism]. 
21. See Robert O’Sullivan & Charles Cormier, Meeting Participating Country 
Responsibilities Under the CDM: Designating a National Authority, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, supra note 
15, at 213, 223. 
22. See Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, supra note 20, at 
14–16. 
23. The Designated Operational Entity is an accredited organization tasked with 
the independent validation of proposed CDM project activities and verification of 
emission reductions. See id. at 15. 
24. See id. 
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project activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other 
Annex I parties.25 The emission credits generated by JI projects 
are known as Emission Reduction Units (“ERUs”). If a host 
party meets certain eligibility requirements,26 it may, under the 
so-called “Track 1 procedure,” independently verify the 
additionality of emission reductions and issue ERUs.27 ERUs are 
issued in proportion to the amount of GHG emissions that the 
project reduces in relation to a baseline.28 ERUs are generated 
by converting Assigned Amount Units (“AAUs”).29 If a host party 
does not meet these requirements, the “Track 2 procedure” 
applies. Under this procedure, JI projects are, in a similar way to 
the CDM project cycle, regulated by an international body—the 
JI Supervisory Committee.30 It is also this institution that 
approves projects and issues ERUs corresponding to the verified 
emission reductions.31 
The risk of the state interfering with the issuance of CERs 
to CDM projects is relatively limited.32 Indeed, it is an 
international institution—the CDM Executive Board—and not 
host states that approve these projects and issue the GHG 
emission credits.33 The same applies to projects implemented 
under the JI “Track 2 procedure.”34 
                                                                                                             
25. See Charlotte Streck, Joint Implementation: History, Requirements, and Challenges, 
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING 
KYOTO WORK, supra note 15, at 107, 107–08. 
26. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol, 1st Sess., Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, Guidelines for the Implementation of 
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, at 6, Decision 9/CMP.1, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Guidelines for the 
Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol]. 
27. See id. at 7. 
28. See id. at 8, 12. 
29. The allowances allocated to the Annex I parties corresponding to their 
greenhouse gas emission limits. 
30. See Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26, 
at 7. 
31. See id. at 7–9. 
32. See Jolene Lin & Charlotte Streck, Mobilising Finance for Climate Change 
Mitigation: Private Sector Involvement in International Carbon Finance Mechanisms, 10 MELB. 
J. INT’L L. 70, 74–75 (2009). 
33. See Modalities and Procedures for a Clean Development Mechanism, supra note 20, at 
14, 19. 
34. See Sander Simonetti, Legal Protection and (the Lack of) Private Party Remedies in 
International Carbon Emission Reduction Projects, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 171, 
179 (2009). The risks related to the issuance of emission credits by the CDM Executive 
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Nevertheless, in theory, host states could detrimentally 
affect the investors concerned by exercising influence on the 
entities (i.e. DOE or Accredited Independant Entity) that are in 
charge of verifying the emission reductions.35 This could have an 
impact on the amount of emission reductions that are certified 
as having been achieved by the project activity. This, in turn, 
would affect the amount of CERs and ERUs issued. Host country 
pressure on the DOE could also affect the renewal of the project 
beyond the first crediting period, that is beyond the first span of 
time during which the host country issues ERUs. 
The risks to JI projects implemented under the “Track 1 
procedure” may be more important. Under this procedure, the 
discretionary power of the host country is much broader due to 
the country’s central role in the issuance of ERUs.36 Host states 
may, for instance, refuse to issue or transfer ERUs to private 
foreign investors notwithstanding their commitments as 
contained in the Letter of Approval.37 Host states may be 
tempted to do so in order to avoid reducing the amount of 
AAUs available to meet international emission reduction 
obligations. Host states might also influence the issuance of 
ERUs by imposing changes to the baseline that is used to 
calculate emission reductions, or simply by withdrawing the 
approval of a JI project and thus its eligibility to receive ERUs.38 
Investors could also face the risk of nationalization of their 
investment.39 
                                                                                                             
Board and the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee are excluded from the 
scope of this paper. See Lin & Streck, supra note 32, at 73, 77–78. 
35. See Dane Ratliff, Arbitration in ‘Flexible-Mechanism’ Contracts, in LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, supra 
note 15, at 377, 383 n.23. 
36. See Streck, supra note 25, at 112. 
37. See Anikó Pogány, Negotiating a JI Contract: A Project Developer’s Perspective, in 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO 
WORK, supra note 15, at 329, 331. 
38. See Chester Brown, International, Mixed, and Private Disputes Arising Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 447, 471 (2010); Charlotte Streck, World 
Bank Carbon Finance Business: Contracts and Emission Reductions Purchase Transactions, in 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO 
WORK, supra note 15, at 355, 369. 
39. See Julian Richardson, Carbon Markets, in COPING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE: 
RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSURERS ch. 17, 13–14 (Chartered Ins. Inst. ed., 2009), 
available at http://www.cii.co.uk/pages/research/climatechangereport.aspx (select 
“Chapter 17” hyperlink); see also Chester Brown, The Settlement of Disputes Arising in 
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B. Risks in National Support Schemes 
National support for renewable energy sources, energy 
efficiency improvements, or other types of low-carbon 
investment is often granted by creating a system of “green 
certificates” (or “white certificates”), “feed-in tariffs,” 
“premiums,” or by granting investment aid or fiscal advantages 
to electricity producers using renewable energy sources.40 
Usually, “green certificate” schemes are arranged in such a 
way that regulatory authorities deliver tradable certificates for a 
certain amount of electricity generated from renewable energy 
sources.41 The value of such certificates is created by obliging 
electricity suppliers to submit a certain amount of certificates to 
the regulatory authorities.42 This amount is generally 
determined in proportion to the producers’ supplies of 
electricity to end consumers.43 Suppliers that fail to meet this 
quota-obligation are fined.44 A secondary market for certificates 
is created where eligible producers and suppliers with too many 
certificates can sell their certificates to other market players.45 
With “feed-in tariff” schemes, the electricity produced from 
renewable energy installations is paid at a fixed minimum 
price.46 This minimum purchase price is generally set higher 
than the market price and guaranteed over a specified 
                                                                                                             
Flexibility Mechanism Transactions Under the Kyoto Protocol, 21 ARB. INT’L 361, 380 (2005); 
MIRJAM HARMELINK & PAUL SOFFE, FINANCING AND FINANCING MECHANISMS FOR JOINT 
IMPLEMENTATION (JI) PROJECTS IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 34, 59 (2001). 
40. For an overview of the support schemes adopted by the European Union 
(“EU”) Member States, see Commission of the European Communities, The 
Renewable Energy Progress Report: Commission Report in Accordance with Article 3 
of Directive 2001/77/EC, Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/30/EC and on the 
Implementation of the EU Biomass Action Plan, COM (2009) 192 Final, at 6–7 (Apr. 
2009), and the Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the 
Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources, COM (2005) 627 Final, at 4–5 
(Dec. 2005) [hereinafter Commission Communication Dec. 2005]. 
41. See N.H. VAN DER LINDEN ET AL., REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH 
RENEWABLE ENERGY OBLIGATION SUPPORT MECHANISMS 10–11 (2005). 
42. See Commission Communication Dec. 2005, supra note 40, at 4. 
43. See VAN DER LINDEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 10. 
44. See DAVID DE JAGER & MAX RATHMANN, POLICY INSTRUMENT DESIGN TO 
REDUCE FINANCING COSTS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS 38 (2008). 
45. See Commission Communication Dec. 2005, supra note 40, at 5. 
46. See id. at 4. 
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duration.47 Usually, this fixed price is combined with a purchase 
obligation for electricity suppliers or network companies.48 
The difference between a “feed-in tariff” and “premium” 
schemes is that the latter involves a premium being applied on 
the electricity market price, whereas feed-in tariffs entitle 
producers to one, all-inclusive, and specific price.49 In premium 
schemes, the amount of support paid to the producers fluctuates 
with the price of electricity on the wholesale market.50 
The experience gathered regarding the implementation of 
support schemes suggests that states might easily succumb to the 
temptation of interfering with the amount and duration of 
support.51 Recent analyses on the effectiveness of support 
schemes for renewable energy implemented in the European 
Union (“EU”), for instance, show that Member States have 
introduced fundamental changes to their policy frameworks.52 
These changes have jeopardized the credibility of renewable 
energy policies and generated high investment uncertainty.53 
                                                                                                             
47. See JOAN CANTON & ÅSA JOHANNESSON LINDÉN, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, ECON. PAPERS NO. 
408, KC-AI-10-408-EN-N, Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity in the EU 7 (2010). 
48. See Commission Communication Dec. 2005, supra note 40, at 5. 
49. See id. 
50. See CANTON & JOHANNESSON LINDÉN, supra note 47, at 9. 
51. See Ryan Katofsky & Lisa Frantzis, Financing Renewables in Competitive Electricity 
Markets, 109 POWER ENGINEERING 76, 76 (2005). 
52. See, e.g., MARIO RAGWITZ ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL FOR ENERGY AND TRANSPORT, INTELLIGENT ENERGY FOR EUROPE PROGRAMME, 
ASSESSMENT AND OPTIMIZATION OF RENEWABLE ENERGIES SUPPORT SCHEMES IN THE 
EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY MARKET: FINAL REPORT 19–21 (2007); IEA, supra note 2, at 319; 
Gerard Marata et al., Renewable Energy Incentives in the United States and Spain: Different 
Paths—Same Destination?, 28 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 481, 498–99 (2010); Letter 
from Ole Beier Sørensen, Chairman, Institutional Investors Grp. on Climate Change, & 
Chief of Strategy & Analysis, ATP, to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, President of Spain 
(June 23, 2010), available at http://www.iigcc.org/ data/ assets/pdf_file/ 0010/ 1009/
IIGCC-letter-to-Spanish-government.pdf (describing the Proposed Retroactive 
Reduction of 661 Tariff for Existing Investments in Spain). 
53. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Energy 2020: A Strategy 
for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy, COM (2010) 639 Final, at 9 (Nov. 
2010) [hereinafter Commission Communication Nov. 2010]; International PV Investors 
Demand Compensation or Repeal for Retroactive Spanish PV Tariff Changes Under 
International Investment Treaty, NA PRESSEPORTAL, Mar. 8, 2011, www.presseportal.de/
pm/78742/2004299/white_owl_capital_ag. 
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Commentators highlight the fact that the austerity 
measures being introduced to cut budget deficits in Europe will 
affect the support for renewable energy.54 Indeed, subsidies for 
renewable energy are often considered “an easy target in times 
of crisis.”55 The problem is not just that governments “will 
reduce subsidies for new projects. The industry regards cuts as 
inevitable . . . . More serious is the fear that [governments] will 
cut agreed subsidies for projects built or under construction.”56 
The European experience shows that investment 
uncertainty resulting from the risk of cuts has a very negative 
effect on the development of renewable energy.57 This can be 
explained by the fact that, from an investor’s perspective, “a 
financial change of the support system is considered the most 
important risk factor” for investments in renewable energy.58 
This is because the level of support is the most important 
element influencing expected profit.59 
The success of support schemes for renewable energy thus 
depends on the “credibility of the public authority’s long-term 
commitment.”60 Gaining this credibility by minimizing investors’ 
expectations of ex post regulatory adjustments is, however, a 
difficult task. The risk is that, once investments are made, the 
public authorities will be tempted to reconsider their 
commitments.61 Indeed, according to Dominique Finon and 
Yannick Perez: 
The public authority is not committed in the regulatory 
contract as much as the developers-operators who invest 
money in [renewable energy sources] RES-E projects; this 
opens the door to discretionary changes in the contract. 
The possible government’s opportunism, exerted in 
unforeseeable amendments of the design of the instruments 
or by willing to change the instrument, creates a risk of 
                                                                                                             
54. See, e.g., Victor Mallet, Shadow Falls Across Spanish Solar Energy Industry, FIN. 
TIMES (London), June 1, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/275db4d0-6cdf-11df-91c8-
00144feab49a.html; see also Marata et al., supra note 52, at 498–99. 
55. See Mallet, supra note 54. 
56. Id.; see Marata et al., supra note 52, at 498–99. 
57. See Commission Communication Nov. 2010, supra note 53, at 9. 
58. RAGWITZ ET AL., supra note 52, at 177–78; see Commission Communication 
Dec. 2005, supra note 40, at 16–17. 
59. See RAGWITZ ET AL., supra note 52, at 178. 
60. Finon & Perez, supra note 6, at 83. 
61. See Helm, Hepburn & Mash, supra note 5, at 440. 
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expropriation of quasi-rents on existing RES-E plants or 
current RES-E investments, and this risk can be a strong 
deterrent against investing in RES-E.62 
The authorities could, for instance, withdraw the promised 
support or shorten its duration. They could refuse to pay or 
diminish the amount of support. In countries with green 
certificate schemes, the host country could refuse to issue the 
certificates or issue fewer certificates than those expected under 
the rules existing at the moment of investment. The host 
country could also reduce the quota and thereby depress the 
price for green certificates. 
Investments in energy efficiency improvements made on 
the basis of “white” certificates or feed-in tariffs, and investments 
in carbon capture and storage based on public support, face 
similar risks. 
 II. PROTECTION OF LOW-CARBON INVESTMENTS UNDER 
EXISTING IIAS 
A. Low-Carbon Investments as “Investments” Protected by IIAs 
To be protected under international investment law, low-
carbon investments should qualify as “investments” within the 
meaning of the applicable IIAs.63 Arbitral practice developed on 
the basis of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States64 defines 
an “investment” on the basis of four criteria (the so-called Salini 
test): contributions by the investor, certain duration of 
performance, the existence of operational risks, and the 
contribution to the economic development of the host state.65 
                                                                                                             
62. Finon & Perez, supra note 6, at 83; see Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, 
Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota and Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power 
Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854, 1861 (2008); Angus Johnston, Amalia Kavali 
& Karsten Neuhoff, Take-or-Pay Contracts for Renewables Deployment, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 
2481, 2482 (2008). 
63. See Freya Baetens, The Kyoto Protocol in Investor-State Arbitration: Reconciling 
Climate Change and Investment Protection Objectives, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN 
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 683, 693 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011). 
64. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 1, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270; 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
65. See Salini Costrutorri S.P.A v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep. 400 (2004); see 
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Most low-carbon investments are likely to fulfill the Salini 
criteria.66 Indeed, investments in renewable energy or other low-
carbon technologies are generally characterized by their high 
capital intensity and long term pay-back period. The high costs 
and social relevance (e.g. for energy supply) of these 
investments expose them to considerable economic, financial, 
and political risk.67 Finally, it cannot be doubted that low-carbon 
projects, particularly those in the energy industry, are important 
for the development of the national economy. 
The Energy Charter Treaty investment regime is limited to 
“any investment associated with an ‘economic activity in the 
energy sector.’”68 Renewable energy projects fall within this 
scope. Indeed, the Final Act of the European Energy Charter 
Conference specifies that renewable energy sources are 
“illustrative of Economic Activity in the Energy Sector.”69 
The same conclusion applies to energy efficiency 
improvement projects. Energy efficiency measures apply to the 
production, transmission, distribution, or sale of energy 
products.70 These measures are by definition associated with the 
energy sector. Moreover, the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy 
Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects considers energy 
savings to be a “source of energy”71—the so-called “fifth energy 
source” besides natural gas, oil, coal, and uranium. Energy 
efficiency investments that lead to energy savings could 
therefore be considered as an economic activity related to the 
exploitation of this “fifth” source of energy. 
Given the intrinsic relationship between GHG emissions 
and the energy sector, most other low-carbon investments are 
also likely to fall within the scope of the Energy Charter Treaty’s 
                                                                                                             
also Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 43 (July 11, 1997), 5 ICSID Rep. 186 (2002). 
66. On the application of the Salini test to energy investments in general, see 
Anna Turinov, ‘Investment’ and ‘Investor’ in Energy Charter Treaty Arbitration: Uncertain 
Jurisdiction, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 1 (2009). 
67. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2008: 
Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge, at 164, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WIR/2008 (Sept. 24, 2008). 
68. Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 13, art. 1(6), at 25. 
69. ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 11, at 25. 
70. See Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental 
Aspects, 1994 O.J. L 380/92, arts. 2(4), 3(4), at 92–93. 
71. See id. art. 1(1), at 92. 
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application. The Energy Charter secretariat considers that 
carbon capture and storage is part of the “energy cycle.”72 
Carbon dioxide capture, its transportation by pipelines, and its 
storage can, according to the Energy Charter secretariat, be 
certified as being “Economic Activities in the Energy Sector.”73 
More generally, the secretariat argues that “[carbon dioxide] 
may be taken within the coverage of the term ‘energy related 
activity.’”74 
A more delicate issue is whether the rights associated with 
low-carbon investment—i.e. the right to benefit from support 
for renewable energy or the right to receive CERs or ERUs—
could qualify as “investments” within the meaning of IIAs.75 In 
their definition of “investment,” many IIAs include “rights 
conferred by law or contract.”76 Arbitral tribunals77 and leading 
commentators78 have consistently ruled that contractual and 
regulatory rights can qualify as “investments,” and that they are 
capable of expropriation. Investors in renewable energy projects 
and in JI and CDM projects generally hold contractual and 
regulatory rights to benefit from support.79 For renewable 
                                                                                                             
72. See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, INVESTMENT AND MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
IN CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: ROLE OF THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 29 (2009). 
73. See id. 
74. Id. at 8. 
75. See Jennifer Morgan, Note, Carbon Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: Risks and 
Opportunities for Investors, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 173 (2006). 
76. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 13, arts. 1(6)(c), 1(6)(f); see also 
DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 60; CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 173 (2007). 
77. See Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. Republic of Taj., Case No. V/064/2008, 
Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 139 (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
2009), http://italaw.com/documents/Al-BahloulvTajikistan_PartialAward_2Sep
2009.pd f [hereinafter Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul]; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve 
Sanayi A.Ş. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 456 
(Aug. 27, 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf; Compañía de 
Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, 
¶¶ 7.5.2, 7.5.4 (Aug. 20, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/Vivendi Award
English.pdf [hereinafter Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija]. 
78. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Taking of Property, 
at 36, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/15 (2000). 
79. See Streck, supra note 38, at 359–60; see also Anatole Boute, The Protection of 
Property Rights Under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Promotion of Low-
Carbon Investments, 1 CLIMATE L. 93, 108–13 (2010); Johnston, Kavali & Neuhoff, supra 
note 62, at 2486, 2497; Matthieu Wemaere & Charlotte Streck, Legal Ownership and 
Nature of Kyoto Units and EU Allowances, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK, supra note 15, at 35, 43–44. 
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energy projects, these rights result from agreements that 
investors conclude with the national public authorities in charge 
of the implementation of the national support schemes for 
renewable energy.80 These agreements concern, for example, 
the certification of renewable energy installations or the 
issuance of renewable energy certificates that entitle the 
operators of eligible installations to public support.81 Regulatory 
rights are derived from the national regulatory framework that 
governs the support of renewable energy sources.82 Similarly, the 
implementation of JI and CDM projects involve the conclusion 
of agreements that formalize the host state’s approval of the 
projects (“Letters of Approval”).83 These agreements also 
provide the investors with contractual claims regarding the 
future issuance or transfer of ERUs or CERs.84 Moreover, 
national regulations governing the implementation of JI projects 
confer upon investors that fulfill all procedural criteria the 
regulatory right to receive ERUs. It is arguable that the 
contractual and regulatory right to benefit from support 
schemes and to receive CERs or ERUs would come within the 
broad ambit of “investments” as understood in arbitral 
practice.85 
                                                                                                             
80. See Department of Energy and Climate Change, Planning Our Electric Future: 
A White Paper for Secure, Affordable and Low-Carbon Electricity, 2011, Cm. 8099, at 7, 
37 (U.K.), available at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/
white_papers/emr_wp_2011/emr_wp_2011.aspx [hereinafter Planning Our Electric 
Future]. 
81. See ASSOCIATION OF ISSUING BODIES, PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF OPERATION 
FOR THE EUROPEAN ENERGY CERTIFICATE SYSTEM 4, 5 (2011) available at 
http://www.aib-net.org/portal/page/portal/AIB_HOME/AIB_OPE/EECS/EECS_ 
Rules/EECS%20Rules%20Release%207.pdf; see also STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
TEMPLATE BETWEEN [THE SCHEME MEMBER] AND [THE MARKET PARTICIPANT] 1–2 
(2011), available at http://www.aib-net.org/portal/page/portal/AIB_HOME/AIB_ 
OPE/EECS/Standard%20Terms%20%20Conditions/STC%20Template%
20Release%203.0.pdf. 
82. See Boute, supra note 79, at 109–10. 
83. See O’Sullivan & Cormier, supra note 21, at 223. 
84. See Streck, supra note 25, at 118–19. 
85. See Morgan, supra note 75, at 173–74; see also Lisa Bennett, Note, Are Tradable 
Carbon Emissions Credits Investments? Characterization and Ramifications Under International 
Investment Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1581, 1590–99 (2010). More generally, on the 
qualification of greenhouse gas emission credits as “possessions” or property, see Harro 
van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far? Developing Countries and the Rule of 
Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 337 (2009); Erich Vranes, 
Climate Change and the WTO: EU Emission Trading and the WTO Disciplines on Trade in 
Goods, Services and Investment Protection, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 707, 716–18 (2009). 
2012] COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE 629 
The classification of regulatory and contractual rights 
relative to the financial support of low-carbon investments as 
“investments” has the effect of bringing these rights within the 
ambit of protection afforded by IIAs. It does not, however, 
necessarily mean that these rights are individually protected 
under the investment disciplines of these IIAs. 
Arbitral tribunals are reluctant to isolate particular 
elements of a larger investment operation and qualify these 
elements as separate investments that would benefit from 
individual protection.86 This is in accordance with the “totality of 
rights,” “indivisible whole,” or “general unity of an investment 
operation” theories. Under these theories, a claim that “forms 
part of a larger series of transactions would not on its own 
qualify as an investment.”87 IIAs, therefore, do not separately 
protect the individual rights associated with an investment 
transaction. IIAs only protect the general investment itself. 
Allegations of expropriation, for instance, are assessed on the 
basis of the impact that the contested measures will have on the 
general investment, not on the potential destruction or 
deprivation of individual rights associated with this general 
investment. 
Some arbitral tribunals have nevertheless accepted that 
specific rights associated with a general investment transaction 
can individually qualify as investments.88 These tribunals justified 
this approach by highlighting the importance of these specific 
rights for the making of the general investment. In Eureko, the 
tribunal argued that “since the grant to Eureko of [these 
specific] rights . . . was a key element of the investment, without 
which it appears that there would have been no investment at 
                                                                                                             
86. See Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, The Concept of Property in Human 
Rights Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 743, 760 (Stephan Breitenmoser et 
al. eds., 2007). 
87. Id. For an application of this theory, see Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. 
v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Jan. 14, 
2004), http://www.asil.org/ilib/Enron.pdf [hereinafter Enron]; Československá 
Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 72 (May 24, 1999), 38 I.L.M. 1708 (1999).  
88. See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, supra note 77, ¶¶ 5.3.9–.10, 7.5.11, 
7.5.25–.26; Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Pol., 12 ICSID Rep. 335, ¶ 144 (UNCITRAL Arb. 
2005) [hereinafter Eureko]; CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech, 9 ICSID Rep. 121, 
¶¶ 376, 384 (UNCITRAL Arb. 2001) [hereinafter CME Czech Republic]. 
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all, the Tribunal concludes that those rights have some 
economic value and are entitled to protection under the 
Treaty.”89 
The specific rights were “critical” to the making of the 
general investment.90 The arbitral tribunals were therefore 
willing to “unbundle”91 the general investment transaction in 
specific investments to protect specific rights individually under 
the investment disciplines of the applicable IIA. 
Given the absence of an international carbon price, the 
provision of additional financial support is often an essential 
precondition—or “key element”—for the making of low-carbon 
investments. Support under the JI and CDM mechanisms, for 
instance, depends on the investment “additionality” of the 
proposed projects.92 Project participants must not only 
demonstrate that their investments will reduce GHG emissions 
in relation to Business as Usual, but they must also prove that 
the financial viability or financial attractiveness of their activity 
depends on additional support provided by ERUs and CERs.93 In 
theory therefore, the financial support represented by these 
GHG emission credits constitutes a critical part of the economic 
foundation of the investment. By the same token, the lack of 
internalization of the carbon externality in electricity prices, and 
the relatively high investment cost of renewable energy 
installations in comparison to traditional power plants, result in 
these investments being, for the moment, dependent on public 
support. Following the award reasoning in Eureko, the 
contractual and regulatory right to benefit from support could 
thus qualify as a specific “investment” entitled to individual 
protection under the applicable IIA. 
                                                                                                             
89. Eureko, supra note 88, ¶ 145 (emphasis added); see Middle East Cement 
Shipping & Handling Co., S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, 
Award, ¶¶ 100–01, 135–38 (Apr. 12, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 173 (2005) [hereinafter 
Middle East Cement].  
90. See Eureko, supra note 88, ¶¶ 144–45. 
91. On the notion of “unbundling” or “dissection” of property rights in the 
context of international investment law, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 371–72 (3d ed. 2010). 
92. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6(1), 12(5)(c); Modalities and Procedures 
for a Clean Development Mechanism, supra note 20, at 14–16. 
93. See CDM Executive Board 39, Methodological Tool: Tool for the Demonstration and 
Assessment of Additionality (Version 05.2), at 5, Annex 10 (Aug. 26, 2008), available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/tools/am-tool-01-v5.2.pdf. 
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The approach followed by the Eureko tribunal offers 
considerable protection to investors that base their general 
investment decisions on specific contractual and regulatory 
rights, such as investors in renewable energy or in JI and CDM 
projects. M. Sornarajah argues that: 
From the point of view of property protection, the abstract 
notion of property as a series of intangible rights has a 
positive effect in that it makes it easier to protect contractual 
rights . . . . A complete range of possible uses of property is 
covered through an unbundling and spelling out of the 
package of rights that previously constituted a single 
bundle . . . . One could argue that a series of property rights 
is spelt out and that impairment of any of those property 
rights could amount to a taking.94 
However, as mentioned above, the approach followed by the 
Eureko tribunal is an exception to the theory of “general unity of 
an investment operation.”95 Investors have no guarantee that 
arbitral tribunals would accept the “unbundl[ing]” of a general 
investment transaction in a series of individual rights, and grant 
these rights separate protection under the investment 
disciplines of the applicable IIA. 
B. Withdrawal of Support as Partial Expropriation 
Withdrawing support for low-carbon investment nullifies an 
investor’s rights to benefit from this support. Could the affected 
investors argue that such interference with their rights 
constitutes a measure tantamount to expropriation? Could 
investors in JI projects argue that a state’s refusal to issue or 
transfer ERUs qualifies as an expropriation of their right to 
receive these emission credits? Could CDM project participants 
successfully invoke the expropriation standard against public 
interference with CERs? 
In accordance with established arbitral practice, the 
threshold that must be reached before an action amounts to an 
expropriation is high. Measures must have a substantial impact 
on the economic benefit and value of the investment 
                                                                                                             
94. SORNARAJAH, supra note 91, at 371–72. 
95. Enron, supra note 87, ¶ 70; see Schreuer & Kriebaum, supra note 86, at 761. 
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concerned.96 They must “radically deprive[] [the claimant] of 
the economic use and enjoyment of its investment,”97 
“effectively neutralize the benefit of the [claimant’s] 
property,”98 “render [the claimant’s property] rights [] 
useless,”99 or “have a similar dispossessory effect.”100 
Expropriation therefore results from actions that deprive the 
investor of full ownership and control of the investment.101 
State interference with the support for low-carbon 
investment is unlikely to destroy the economic value of the 
overall investment or deprive investors of full ownership and 
control of their assets. Even if the support for renewable energy 
is entirely cancelled, investors are still in control of their 
installations. They continue to receive revenues for the 
electricity produced and sold on the market. Similarly, a state’s 
refusal to issue ERUs does not render an investor’s property 
rights in the overall JI investment useless. Public interference 
with CERs does not radically deprive CDM investors of the 
economic use of their investments. Indeed, for projects 
benefiting from support under the flexible mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol, “[i]ncome from the sale of carbon credits 
usually makes up only a portion of the overall project budget, 
meaning that project owners also need other sources of 
financing to carry out their plans.”102 The protection of low-
carbon investors under the expropriation standard would 
therefore depend on whether the right to receive support 
                                                                                                             
96. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 101; see also L. Yves Fortier & 
Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It 
When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 293, 305 
(2004). 
97. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 115 (May 29, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004) 
[hereinafter Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed]; see Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa 
Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, ¶ 77 
(Feb. 17, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 157 (2002). 
98. CME Czech Republic, supra note 88, ¶ 150. 
99. Starrett Housing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
122, ¶ 2 (1983). 
100. Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, supra note 77, ¶ 7.5.24; see also National Grid 
P.L.C. v. Arg. Republic, Case No. 1:09-cv-00248-RBW, Award, ¶ 149 (UNCITRAL Arb. 
2008), http://italaw.com/documents/NGvArgentina.pdf. 
101. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, 40 I.L.M. 258, ¶ 100 
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. 2000) [hereinafter Pope & Talbot]. 
102. Kulovesi, supra note 19, at 150. 
2012] COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE 633 
constitutes a specific investment that is protected independently 
from the impact on the overall investment. 
As mentioned above, most arbitral tribunals opt to follow 
the theory of “the general unity of an investment operation.”103 
In accordance with this theory, these tribunals refuse to qualify 
measures that destroy specific rights as expropriation when the 
investors remain in control of the overall investment to which 
these rights are associated.104 In CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. 
Argentine Republic and in Occidental Exploration and Production Co. 
v. Republic of Ecuador, for instance, each tribunal “rejected the 
possibility that an investment can be disassembled into a 
number of discrete rights, each of which is capable of being 
expropriated independently of the overall investment.”105 The 
tribunal reached that conclusion despite the fact that the 
applicable IIAs included “any right deferred by law or contract” 
within the definition of an investment.106 
In Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co., S.A. v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, by contrast, the tribunal chose to examine 
specific rights and assets separately under the expropriation 
clause.107 Having analyzed whether each individual right met the 
definition of “investment” outlined in the applicable IIA,108 the 
tribunal examined whether the host state had deprived the 
investor of the value of each specific right independently of the 
impact on the overall investment.109 The tribunal in Eureko B.V. 
                                                                                                             
103. See, e.g., Enron, supra note 87, ¶ 70; Schreuer & Kriebaum, supra note 87, at 
760–71. 
104. See Ursula Kriebaum, Partial Expropriation, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 
69, 73–78 (2007); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 107. 
105. Kriebaum, supra note 104, at 74; see CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 263–64 (May 12, 2005), 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=s
howDoc&docId=DC504_En&caseId=C4 [hereinafter CMS Gas Transmission]; 
Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Final Award, 43 
I.L.M. 1248, ¶¶ 86–89 (London Ct. Int’l Arb. 2004). 
106. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, art. 1(a)(v), Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-15 
(1993) (entered into force May 11, 1997); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. 1(a)(v), Nov. 14, 1991, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1993) (entered into force Oct. 20, 1994). 
107. See Middle East Cement, supra note 89, ¶¶ 107, 143–44. 
108. See id. ¶¶ 100–01, 135–38. 
109. See id. ¶¶ 107, 143–44. 
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v. Poland followed a similar approach.110 Although it explicitly 
acknowledged that the contested measure did not affect the 
basic investment, it ruled that the host state had expropriated 
the specific rights—“key elements”—associated with this 
investment.111 According to Ursula Kriebaum, the Eureko award 
“demonstrates that even in a situation where the basic 
investment remains unaffected, the deprivation of contract 
rights that are related to the basic investment may amount to a 
taking.”112 
Other awards have followed an intermediary approach. In 
CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, the tribunal accepted 
that the specific rights in question were covered by the 
definition of investment and could accordingly be 
expropriated.113 However, in contrast to the Middle East Cement 
and Eureko awards, the tribunal ruled that the measure 
amounted to an expropriation because it “destroyed . . . the 
commercial value of the investment.”114 
Reflecting on the Middle East Cement, Eureko, and CME 
cases, Kriebaum argues that determining whether a “right is 
capable of economic exploitation independently of the 
remainder of the investment” is an important criterion in 
assessing a specific right, in isolation from the overall 
investment, under the expropriation standard.115 Specific rights 
will be protected individually against expropriation if these 
rights are “key elements” of an investment and can be exploited 
separately from the rest of the investment.116 According to 
Kriebaum, if these criteria are met, interference with such 
specific rights could constitute a “partial expropriation” that 
would violate the expropriation standard.117 
ERUs and CERs have an intrinsic economic value. They can 
be sold independently on the international carbon market.118 It 
                                                                                                             
110. See Eureko, supra note 88, ¶ 145. 
111. See id. 
112. See Kriebaum, supra note 104, at 81. 
113. See CME Czech Republic, supra note 88, ¶¶ 376, 384. 
114. See id. ¶ 591; see also Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, supra note 77, 
¶¶ 7.5.25–.26. 
115. See Kriebaum, supra note 104, at 83. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. 
118. See Wemaere & Streck, supra note 79, at 36. 
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is arguable that they constitute a “right [that] is capable of 
economic exploitation independently of the remainder of the 
investment.”119 They could, therefore, be subject to partial 
expropriation. 
Qualifying support schemes for renewable energy as 
independent economic rights is less straightforward. “Green 
certificates” are usually tradable on a secondary market where 
they can be sold independently from the overall investment. 
Green certificates could, therefore, qualify as individual 
investments that could be subject to partial expropriation. 
However, “feed-in tariffs” or “premium schemes” entitle the 
operators of renewable energy installations to fixed prices.120 
This fixed support usually may not be traded independently 
from the main electricity transaction.121 Feed-in tariffs and 
premium schemes, therefore, cannot be considered capable of 
independent economic exploitation. In accordance with current 
arbitral practice, investors will find it more challenging to 
successfully invoke the expropriation standard against state 
interference with feed-in tariffs and premium schemes than 
against state interference with green certificates. 
C. Protection Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
It is generally accepted that the fair and equitable 
treatment standard requires the host state to observe the “basic 
expectations that were taken into account by the foreign 
investors to make the investment.”122 An investor’s legitimate 
expectations must be based on “representations, commitments 
or specific conditions offered by the State concerned”123 and 
                                                                                                             
119. Kriebaum, supra note 104, at 83. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. (describing how feed-in tariffs consist as part of a “total price per unit 
of electricity paid to the producers”).  
122. See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Investment 
Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law 15–16 (Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice N.Y.U. 
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 6, 2006) (quoting Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, 
supra note 97, ¶ 154); see also Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard: Recent Developments, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 111, 124, 127, 
130 (August Reinisch ed., 2008). 
123. National Grid P.L.C. v. Arg. Republic, Case No. 1:09-cv-00248-RBW, Award, 
¶ 173 (UNCITRAL Arb. 2008), http://italaw.com/documents/NGvArgentina.pdf; see 
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 
¶ 331 (Sept. 11, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/Pakerings.pdf [hereinafter 
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relied upon by the investor in making the investment.124 Arbitral 
tribunals pay particular attention to the conditions that the host 
state proposes and the promises it makes to attract foreign 
investors. In Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, for 
instance, the tribunal considered that the requirement not to 
affect the basic expectations taken into account by the investor 
to make its investment “becomes particularly meaningful when 
the investment has been attracted and induced by means of 
assurances and representations . . . .”125 In Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. 
United States, the tribunal specified that a breach of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard may be exhibited by “the creation 
by the State of objective expectations in order to induce 
investment and the subsequent repudiation of those 
expectations.”126 In CME Czech Republic, the tribunal considered 
that the host state breached its obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment by “evisceration of the arrangements in reliance upon 
with [sic] the foreign investor was induced to invest.”127 
W. Michael Reisman and Mahnoush Arsanjani argue that: 
“Where a host State which seeks foreign investment acts 
intentionally, so as to create expectations in potential investors 
with respect to particular treatment or comportment, the host 
                                                                                                             
Parkerings]; Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 45 I.L.M. 792, 
¶ 147 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. 2006). 
124. See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, supra note 97, ¶ 154; see also Eureko, 
supra note 88, ¶ 235. On the importance of investors’ reliance on expectations to make 
their investment decisions, see Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul, supra note 77, ¶¶ 199–
217. 
125. See Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, 
Award, ¶ 298 (Sept. 28, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet? 
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC694_En&caseId=C8 
[hereinafter Sempra]. The Sempra award has been nullified by the decision of the ad 
hoc committee of June 29, 2010 on the Argentine Republic’s Application for 
Annulment of the award. The ad hoc committee did not, however, criticize the Sempra 
tribunal’s interpretation and application of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
It nullified the award based on a manifest excess of power in the application of the 
emergency exception of the applicable bilateral investment treaty. See Sempra Energy 
Int’l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Annulment Proceeding, ¶ 223 
(June 29, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1550_En&caseId=C8. 
126. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 620–21, 627 
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
125798.pdf. 
127. See CME Czech Republic, supra note 88, ¶ 611. 
2012] COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE 637 
state should . . . be bound by the commitments and the investor 
is entitled to rely upon them in instances of decision.”128 
Support schemes for renewable energy create incentives 
that aim to stimulate private investment in the development of 
renewable energy.129 Similarly, national regulatory frameworks 
that govern JI projects aim to attract investment in GHG 
emission reduction projects to the benefit of the national 
economy.130 Low-carbon investors build their business cases on 
the basis of these policies and promises of support.131 They 
invest in reliance upon the faithful implementation of support 
commitments made by host states.132 Investors in renewable 
energy expect to receive public support in accordance with the 
schemes existing at the time of investing.133 Participants in JI 
projects meanwhile count on an amount of ERUs corresponding 
to the verified emission reductions that are generated by their 
approved projects.134 
Given the lack of internalization of the carbon externality, 
public support is a conditio sine qua non of a low-carbon 
investment.135 It is often the “essential foundation for the 
                                                                                                             
128. W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Question of Unilateral 
Governmental Statements as Applicable Law in Investment Disputes, in COMMON VALUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT 409, 422 (Pierre-
Marie Dupuy ed., 2006). 
129. See IEA, supra note 2, at 293. 
130. See Streck, supra note 25, at 107. 
131. See, e.g., Planning Our Electric Future, supra note 80, at 34; DEP’T OF ENERGY 
& CLIMATE CHANGE, UK RENEWABLE ENERGY ROADMAP 27 (2011) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/renewable-energy/
2167-uk-renewable-energy-roadmap.pdf; Helm, Hepburn & Mash, supra note 5, at 439. 
132. See DE JAGER & RATHMANN, supra note 44, at 10–11. 
133. See id. at 15–32, 119; DEUTSCHE BANK CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS, GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY TRACKER: AN INVESTOR’S ASSESSMENT 11–12 (2009), available 
at http://www.dbcca.com/dbcca/EN/_media/Global_Climate_ Change_Policy_
Tracker_Exec_Summary.pdf. 
134. Streck, supra note 25, at 118–19. 
135. According to Michael Grubb, Tooraj Jamasb, and Michael Pollitt, “[p]ublic 
support for the . . . development and deployment of new technologies and industries to 
reduce emissions is vital.” Michael Grubb, Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, A Low-
Carbon Electricity Sector for the UK: Issues and Options, in DELIVERING A LOW-CARBON 
ELECTRICITY SYSTEM: TECHNOLOGIES, ECONOMICS AND POLICY 278, 300 (Michael Grubb 
et al. eds., 2008); see IEA, supra note 2, at 277; Letter from Institutional Investors Grp. 
on Climate Change, to D. José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero on the Proposed Retroactive 
Reduction of 661 Tariff for Existing Investments (June 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.iigcc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1009/IIGCC-letter-to-Spanish-
government.pdf; MARIO RAGWITZ ET AL., ASSESSMENTS AND OPTIMISATION OF 
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investment—without it, it [the investment] could not survive 
economically.”136 The fair and equitable treatment standard 
could therefore provide important guarantees of protection 
against eviscerations by the state on the arrangements it has 
made to attract low-carbon investments. According to the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the fair 
and equitable treatment standard “could be used to challenge 
the refusal of expected government support [and] the 
dismantling of market-creating mechanisms.”137 
The pre-investment legal order does not only form the 
framework for the positive reach of investors’ expectations. It 
also provides “the scope of considerations upon which the host 
state is entitled to rely when it defends against subsequent claims 
of the foreign investor.”138 In the design of national JI 
regulations, states often aim to retain a degree of discretion to 
issue and discontinue ERUs.139 According to Werksman, 
“[w]hen establishing emissions allowance and offset schemes at 
the domestic level, government authorities have been careful to 
avoid any legal characterization that these instruments can 
provide the basis for legal entitlements or property rights.”140 
Similarly, states can maintain a degree of regulatory discretion 
in the design of support schemes for renewable energy sources 
by stipulating that the amount and duration of support will be 
subject to revisions.141 Are such “waiver clauses” sufficient to 
                                                                                                             
RENEWABLE ENERGY SUPPORT SCHEMES IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY MARKET: FINAL 
REPORT 178 (Intelligent Energy Eur. ed., 2007), available at 
http://www.optres.fhg.de/OPTRES_FINAL_REPORT.pdf. 
136. Thomas Wälde & Kaj Hobér, The First Energy Charter Treaty Arbitral Award, 
22 J. INT’L ARB. 83, 98 (2005). 
137. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2010: 
Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy, at 137, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/WIR/2010 (July 22, 
2010) [hereinafter World Investment Report 2010]. 
138. Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment 
Treaties, 39 INT’L L. 87, 103 (2005); see also JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 232 (2010). 
139. Jacob D. Werksman, Defending the “Legitimate Expectations” of Privates Investors 
Under the Climate Change Regime: In Search of a Legal Theory for Redress, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
679, 690 (2008). 
140. Id. at 689. 
141. See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/96/EC on Restructuring the Community 
Framework for the Taxation of Energy Products and Electricity, 2003 O.J. L 283/51, 
art. 16(3), at 57 [hereinafter Restructuring the Community Framework Directive]. 
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prevent the creation of legitimate expectations protected under 
the fair and equitable treatment standard? 
The Court of Justice for the European Union was 
confronted with a similar question. This question arose in the 
context of a claim challenging the withdrawal of a support 
scheme for renewable energy under the principle of the 
protection of legitimate expectations in EU law.142 Plantanol—a 
German manufacturer of biofuel—complained that, by 
withdrawing a tax exemption scheme that was aimed at 
promoting the use of biofuel in the transport sector, Germany 
had violated Plantanol’s legitimate expectations to benefit from 
this scheme.143 Germany defended the contested withdrawal by 
arguing that it was necessary to avoid overcompensating biofuel 
producers following the introduction of new regulatory 
obligations, and changes in primary energy prices.144 The tax 
exemption scheme was based on a former directive created to 
promote the use of biofuels for transport145 and on the Council 
Directive for the taxation of energy products.146 The latter 
Directive explicitly entitles Member States to reconsider and 
withdraw support to avoid overcompensation.147 The European 
Court of Justice argued on this basis that: 
[A] regulatory provision of this kind was . . . capable of 
indicating at the outset to prudent and circumspect 
economic operators that the tax exemption scheme 
applicable to biofuels was liable to be adjusted or even 
withdrawn by the national authorities in order to take 
account of changes in certain external circumstances and 
that, consequently, no certainty that such a scheme would 
                                                                                                             
142. Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, Case C-201/08, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-08343, ¶ 62. 
143. Id. ¶¶ 20–30. 
144. Id. ¶ 61. 
145. See generally Council Directive 2003/30/EC on the Promotion of the Use of 
Biofuels or Other Renewable Fuels for Transport, 2003 O.J. L 123/42 [hereinafter 
Council Directive on the Promotion of the Use of Biofuels], invalidated by Council 
Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and 
Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC 2009, O.J. L 140/16 
[hereinafter Renewable Energy Sources Directive]. 
146. Restructuring the Community Framework Directive, supra note 141, at 52. 
147. See id. art. 16(3), at 57. 
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be maintained for a given period could be based on those 
rules.148 
Although the Plantanol case provides interesting guidance 
on the application of the principle of legitimate expectations to 
the withdrawal of support for low-carbon investments, its 
relevance for claims under investment arbitration must be 
considered with care. The threshold for violations of the 
principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations under 
EU law can be considered to be higher than the threshold for 
breaches of fair and equitable treatment under international 
investment law. Market players have only rarely succeeded in 
convincing the Court of Justice that their expectations were 
eviscerated.149 This can be explained by the fact that the court 
often seems to require an explicit guarantee in the legislation 
that measures would be maintained unchanged.150 In contrast, 
arbitral tribunals, with the notorious exceptions of the awards in 
Parkerings151 and AES,152 usually do not require explicit 
stabilization guarantees to recognize the legitimacy of investors’ 
expectations.153 As mentioned before, legitimate expectations 
are protected under the fair and equitable treatment standard 
where states act to induce investments, and the resulting 
arrangements constitute crucial elements in reliance of which 
investors base their business case.154  
Moreover, according to the Tecmed tribunal: “The investor 
also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern 
the actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with 
the function usually assigned to such instruments.”155 The 
“function usually assigned” to support schemes for renewable 
                                                                                                             
148. Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, Case C-201/08, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-08343, ¶ 62. 
149. TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 268 (2d ed. 2006). 
150. See, e.g., Vereniging voor Energie v. Directeur van de Dienst uitvoering en 
toezicht energie, Case C-17/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-04983, ¶ 78. 
151. Parkerings, supra note 123, ¶¶ 334–36. 
152. See AES Summit Generation Ltd. & AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Republic of 
Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶¶ 9.3.25–.26 (Sept. 23, 2010), 50 I.L.M. 
186 (2011) [hereinafter AES]; see also Total, S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 310–12 (Dec. 27, 2010), http://iatlaw.com/
documents/TotalvArgentina_DecisiononLiability.pdf [hereinafter Total]. 
153. AES, supra note 152, ¶ 9.3.25. 
154. See generally Sempra, surpa note 125. 
155. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, supra note 97, ¶ 154. 
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energy and to JI schemes is to stimulate low-carbon investments 
by ensuring their financial viability.156 Substantial changes to 
these schemes that would make it impossible for the concerned 
installations to recover their investment costs and earn a 
reasonable profit would thus be incompatible with the 
fundamental function of these support instruments.157 Such 
changes should therefore, in most cases, be considered as an 
interference with investor expectations. 
Wemaere and Streck argue that, as states seek to maintain 
regulatory discretion over the GHG emission credits they create, 
it appears necessary to protect investors against the “arbitrary 
confiscation or discounting of these rights.”158 They further state 
that “in the context of the implementation of JI projects, project 
participants may legitimately expect to receive an amount of 
ERUs corresponding to the verified emission reductions they 
generated” by their investment.159 By the same token, renewable 
energy investors can reasonably expect to benefit from the 
support scheme to which they were entitled at the moment of 
investing, for the period of time initially promised.160 National 
regulations may, to a certain extent, limit these expectations.161 
These regulations cannot, however, be interpreted so as to 
totally nullify the rights of the investors that made their business 
decisions relying on the implementation of support schemes.162 
Waiver clauses, especially when formulated in broad and vague 
terms,163 do not affect investors’ expectations to such an extent 
as to allow their total destruction.164 
                                                                                                             
156. IEA, supra note 2, at 293. 
157. See also Total, supra note 152, ¶ 313. 
158. See Wemaere & Streck, supra note 79, at 53; see also Boute, supra note 79, at 
113. 
159. Boute, supra note 79, at 113; see Streck, supra note 25, at 118–19. 
160. See Boute, supra note 79, at 127; see also DE JAGER & RATHMANN, supra note 
44, at 15–32, 119; DEUTSCHE BANK CLIMATE CHANGE ADVISORS, supra note 133, at 11–
12. 
161. Boute, supra note 79, at 113; see Werksman, supra note 139, at 689–90; see also 
Restructuring the Community Framework Directive, supra note 141, art. 16, at 57. 
162. Boute, supra note 79, at 113. 
163. In Russia, for instance, O Porjadke Utverzhdenija I Proverki Hoda Realizacii 
Proektov, Osushhestvljaemyh v Sootvetstkvii so Stat’ej 6 Kiotskogo Protokola k 
Ramochnoj Konvencii OON ob Izmenenii Kliamata [Decree No. 332, Government of 
the Russian Federation, On the Procedure of Adopting and Monitoring the 
Development of Projects Implemented Under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change], 24(e) SOBRANIE 
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D. National Treatment and Nondiscrimination 
National treatment requires host states not to treat foreign 
investors less favorably than national investors who are in a 
comparable situation, unless such difference in treatment is 
reasonably justified by public interest objectives.165 The 
prohibition of discriminatory measures is not limited to 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, but applies to all types 
of difference in treatment.166 Could public interference with the 
right of foreign investors to benefit from support schemes for 
renewable energy or with their right to GHG emission credits 
constitute an unjustified difference in treatment? This question 
was at the heart of the Nykomb v. Latvia case.167 
Nykomb claimed that Latvia had violated the national 
treatment standard in the Energy Charter Treaty by refusing to 
honor a promise of support for low-carbon electricity 
production on the basis of which he made his investment.168 The 
tribunal accepted Nykomb’s discrimination claim and ordered 
Latvia to compensate his losses.169 Indeed, the tribunal observed 
that the administrator of the support scheme continued to 
support low-carbon installations operated by domestic investors, 
while refusing this payment to a foreign investor, Nykomb, 
operating in comparable conditions.170 
                                                                                                             
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of 
Legislation] 2007, No. 23, Item 2797, invalidated by O Merah po Realizacii Stat’ej 6 
Kiotskogo Protokola k Ramochnoj Konvencii OON ob Izmenenii Kliamata [Decree No. 
843, Government of the Russian Federation, On the Measures of Implementing the 
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change] SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] 
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2009, No. 44, Item 5240, granted the 
Russian Government almost unlimited discretion to withdraw support for projects even 
after they were approved as eligible for such support. See ANNA KORPPOO & ARILD MOE, 
RUSSIAN JI PROCEDURES: MORE PROBLEMS THAN SOLUTIONS? 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.climatestrategies.org/ reportfiles/ russian_ji_procedures.pdf. 
164. Boute, supra note 79, at 112. 
165. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 179; Andrea K. Bjorklund, 
National Treatment, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 27, 29 (August Reinisch 
ed., 2008). 
166. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 176. 
167. See generally Nykomb Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Republic of Lat., SCC 
Case No. 118/2001, Award (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2003) [hereinafter 
Nykomb]. 
168. See id. ¶ 1.1. 
169. See id. ¶ 4.3.2. 
170. See id. 
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The outcome of the Nykomb case is of considerable 
importance for low-carbon investors. It illustrates the potential 
protection that investment arbitration might offer against 
illegitimate interference by the state with the financial and 
regulatory basis of investments. Indeed, the Nykomb case is about 
“bringing modern environmentally friendly and energy 
efficient . . . technology into an [obsolete] electricity 
industry.”171 It concerns a “green investor” that “finds his 
investment based on a commitment to pay a double tariff 
undermined because it is much cheaper for the state electricity 
monopoly to purchase imported electricity produced without 
any internalization of external costs.”172 The Nykomb award 
demonstrates that IIAs “create rights for investors against a host 
government for changing incentives and subsidies committed to 
a foreign investor . . . [IIAs] enable[] a host state to make a 
credible and internationally enforceable promise about 
investment incentives and guarantees with respect to [low-
carbon] energy investment.”173 
However, the protection of low-carbon investors under the 
national treatment standard suffers from one important 
limitation: states may not always change or withdraw support by 
targeting international investors, but may introduce measures 
that affect the support for all low-carbon investors, including 
national investors.174 In case of a general refusal to observe 
commitments of support, foreign investors could not rely on the 
national treatment standard by arguing that this measure 
“targeted Claimants’ investments specifically as foreign 
investments.”175 
E. Umbrella Clauses 
Contractual relations are central to support schemes for 
renewable energy and domestic schemes for the implementation 
                                                                                                             
171. Wälde & Hobér, supra note 136, at 102–03. 
172. Id. 
173. Sussman, supra note 9, at 402. 
174. See Boute, supra note 14, at 362. 
175. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision 
on Liability, ¶ 147 (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 36 (2006) [hereinafter LG&E Energy Corp.]; 
see Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 180 (Oct. 
12, 2005), http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf [hereinafter Noble Ventures]. 
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of the project-based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. As 
mentioned above, these contracts concern the certification of 
renewable energy installations and their eligibility to benefit 
from support schemes. For JI and CDM projects, contractual 
relations concern the approval of projects by the host state (e.g. 
Letters of Approval). Contracts also govern the issuance and 
transfer of GHG emission rights. 
Umbrella clauses, also known as sanctity of contracts 
clauses, in IIAs aim to guarantee by treaty the respect by the host 
state for the specific obligations it enters into with investors (the 
pacta sunt servanda principle).176 Could low-carbon investors 
successfully invoke these clauses against breaches by the state of 
the contractual obligations made to facilitate the 
implementation of their investments? Arbitral tribunals and 
commentators are divided on the scope of umbrella clauses. 
These divisions reflect on the potential protection that these 
clauses might offer to low-carbon investors. 
The most contentious issue relates to the nature of the 
obligations covered by these clauses.177 Some tribunals have 
adopted a broad interpretation by considering that all 
contractual obligations are protected by umbrella clauses.178 
Others have refused to accord a broad scope to these clauses by 
introducing a distinction between the “state as a sovereign” (acta 
jure imperii) and the “state as a merchant” (acta jure gestionis).179 
On the basis of this distinction, tribunals have declined to grant 
                                                                                                             
176. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 153; MCLACHLAN, SHORE & 
WEINIGER, supra note 76, at 92; Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause 
in Investment Agreements 3 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Working Papers on Int’l 
Inv. No. 2006/3). 
177. See Thomas Wälde, Contract Claims Under the Energy Charter Treaty’s Umbrella 
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Energy LLC v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13 & BP America Production 
Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, Decision on Preliminary Objections, ¶ 
108 (July 27, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-
eng.pdf [hereinafter Pan American Energy]. 
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protection to an “ordinary commercial contract entered into by 
the State.”180 These tribunals have therefore limited the scope of 
umbrella clauses to additional investment protections 
contractually agreed by the state in an investment agreement.181 
The promotion of renewable energy and the reduction of 
GHG emissions are objectives of public policy.182 The contracts 
that states sign with investors to stimulate this kind of investment 
are framed to pursue objectives of public interest.183 Arguably, 
Letters of Approval of JI and CDM projects—where states 
authorize the implementation of these GHG emission reduction 
projects—involve the “state as a sovereign” rather than “the 
state as a merchant.”184 Letters of Approval relate more to 
investment agreements than to ordinary commercial 
contracts.185 For JI projects, the host state takes the commitment 
to issue and transfer the ERUs to the investor’s account.186 A 
refusal by the state to transfer ERUs as agreed in a Letter of 
Approval or in other agreements made with the investors could 
thus amount to a breach of an umbrella clause. 
A second point of debate concerns the application of the 
rules of attribution to umbrella clauses. In accordance with the 
rules of attribution, acts of separate entities are only attributable 
to the state if it is shown that these entities exercise “puissance 
publique (governmental authority) or acted on the instructions 
of, or under the direction or control of, the State in carrying out 
the conduct.”187 Is there a violation of the applicable IIA if a 
legal entity separate from the central state has breached a 
contractual obligation it had entered into with an investor?188 
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Some arbitral tribunals have been reluctant to apply the 
international rules of attribution to investment agreements.189 
Other tribunals, such as the one in Noble Ventures v. Romania, 
have accepted that contractual breaches by a separate public 
entity can be attributed to the host state.190 
Support schemes for renewable energy are often 
administrated by entities that are separate from the state. In the 
EU, for instance, Member States tend to charge independent 
entities (e.g. network operators) with the administration of 
support schemes in order to avoid qualification as state aid.191 
Attribution to the state of contractual breaches by these separate 
entities will eventually depend on the influence that the central 
government exercised on the decision to breach the contract. 
The attribution issue is more straightforward as it applies to 
JI projects.192 Indeed, although separate entities from the state, 
such as the Accredited Independent Entities, are involved in the 
approval of JI projects and in the monitoring of emissions, the 
main decisions are taken by the Focal Point and this is generally 
part of the state apparatus (often the Ministry of Energy or the 
Ministry of Environment).193 It is the Focal Point that will decide 
on the conversion of the national AAUs to ERUs.194 It is also the 
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Focal Point that will decide on the transfer of the ERUs to the 
account of the project participants.195 
A third issue is whether the scope of umbrella clauses is 
limited to investor–state contracts or if it extends to other 
investment-related promises made by the host state.196 Many 
arbitral tribunals accept a broad interpretation of the type of 
“obligations” covered by umbrella clauses.197 A broad 
interpretation will include commitments or promises made 
unilaterally by host states in their domestic legislation as being 
within the scope of umbrella clauses.198 However, not all legal 
obligations resulting from the domestic regulatory framework 
are protected under umbrella clauses.199 Arbitral tribunals 
generally require that the obligations “must have been assumed 
vis-à-vis the specific investment—not as a matter of the 
application of some legal obligation of a general character.”200 
Promises of support are investor specific. They are made vis-
à-vis investors in renewable energy sources or, in the context of 
JI projects, vis-à-vis investors in eligible GHG emission reduction 
projects.201 It is therefore arguable that violations of legally 
established commitments to support renewable energy or to 
issue ERUs to approved JI projects could amount to a breach of 
umbrella clauses. 
F. Justification of Interference by Objectives of Public Policy? 
The protection of an investor’s rights under international 
arbitration is not absolute. Arbitral practice generally 
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acknowledges a host state’s sovereign right to regulate.202 Could 
host states successfully argue that the withdrawal or substantial 
modification of support for low-carbon investments is reasonably 
justified by objectives of public policy? 
States could legitimately argue that they must have the right 
to adapt the level and duration of support to avoid 
overcompensating low-carbon investments.203 
Overcompensation could occur following increases in the price 
of electricity or following the internalization of the carbon 
externality on the basis of a potential post-2012 international 
agreement on climate change.204 
However, states could also decide to withdraw or modify 
support schemes to reduce public debt or to decrease energy 
prices for consumers in advance of upcoming elections. This 
would have the effect of imposing the financial burden of 
climate policies on private investors. Under investment 
arbitration, could such short-term policy (or populist) objectives 
justify interference with low-carbon investors’ rights and 
expectations? 
Assessing an investor’s claim under the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, the Saluka tribunal considered that: 
No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally 
unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration of 
the foreign investor’s expectations was justified and 
reasonable, the host State’s legitimate right subsequently to 
regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be 
taken into consideration as well.205 
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In determining a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard a tribunal is therefore required to weigh the investors’ 
legitimate and reasonable expectations against the legitimate 
regulatory interests of the host state. 
This balancing206 or proportionality207 test is unlikely to 
affect the conclusion that substantial interference with the 
commitments that states have made to attract low-carbon 
investment violates the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
Indeed, an assessment of alleged breaches of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard will be more stringent where the 
regulatory change affects specific conditions that the host state 
offered to investors and where these conditions were 
determinant for the investment decision.208 In the words of the 
CMS tribunal: 
It is not a question of whether the legal framework might 
need to be frozen as it can always evolve and be adapted to 
changing circumstances, but neither is it a question of 
whether the framework can be dispensed with altogether 
when specific commitments to the contrary have been 
made.209 
Arbitral tribunals also pay attention to public policy 
objectives in the assessment of alleged violations of the 
nondiscrimination standard. In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, for 
instance, the tribunal highlighted, in the context of the 
comparison of foreign and domestic investors, that 
“[d]ifferences in treatment will presumptively violate [the 
national treatment obligation], unless they have a reasonable 
nexus to rational government policies.”210 Differences in 
treatment are thus justifiable if they pursue a public interest 
objective. 
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In Nykomb v. Latvia, the tribunal decided that the host state 
had failed to justify on the basis of public policy why it refused to 
pay the promised support to the foreign investor, whilst 
continuing to support national investors.211 It appears extremely 
difficult for states to justify the necessity and proportionality of a 
change to a support scheme that would only affect foreign 
investors.212 However, states could more easily justify general 
changes that equally affect domestic and foreign investors. The 
public policy reasons that states could invoke are broad. 
According to the recent award in AES, even purely political 
actions taken to please the electorate in the context of 
upcoming elections could qualify as reasonable objectives.213 
Based on current arbitral practice, states could thus refer to 
budgetary difficulties or consumer protection to legitimize the 
general withdrawal of support schemes under the non-
discrimination standard. 
A more controversial issue is to what extent host states’ 
right to regulate in the public interest (states’ “police powers”) 
must be taken into account in the assessment of regulatory 
measures under the expropriation standard.214 On the one 
hand, according to the “sole effect” doctrine, which is followed 
in certain awards, the effect of governmental action on the 
investment is the preponderant and sole factor in assessing 
whether there has been an expropriation.215 On the other hand, 
many tribunals recognize a host state’s “police powers,” and take 
them into account to justify the impact of these measures on 
foreign investments.216 According to the Tecmed tribunal: “There 
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between 
the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the 
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aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”217 In 
the application of the proportionality test, arbitral tribunals take 
into account investors’ legitimate expectations218 and the degree 
of deprivation imposed on investors’ rights. Measures that 
completely and permanently annihilate investors’ expectations 
and the economic value of their investment will rarely meet the 
proportionality and reasonability criterion.219 According to 
Thomas Waelde and Abba Kolo: “In the extreme case of 
complete and indefinite destruction of the economic value of 
property by otherwise fully legitimate regulation, and if 
individuals are required by regulation to make a special sacrifice 
in terms of their proprietary rights for the benefit of the society 
at large, compensation is . . . owed.”220 
As mentioned above, the creation of specific rights and 
expectations is central to support schemes for low-carbon 
investments. Withdrawing support could lead to the destruction 
of low-carbon investors’ rights and expectations to benefit from 
support. It could place most financial costs of renewable energy 
and GHG emission reduction policies on the private sector. If 
arbitral tribunals would agree to assess support schemes 
individually under the expropriation standard, it is arguable that 
the destruction of investors’ rights of support would fail the 
proportionality test and would therefore amount to an illegal 
expropriation. 
G. Preliminary Assessment 
Existing investment standards have, in theory, the potential 
to adequately protect investors in low-carbon projects against a 
state’s refusal to honor the promises of support that they have 
made to attract projects. In accordance with a certain arbitral 
practice, withdrawal of support could be qualified as “partial 
expropriation” of an investor’s regulatory and contractual 
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right(s) to receive the additional revenues that are necessary to 
enable the financial viability of their investments. Substantial 
changes to support schemes could amount to a violation of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard by frustrating an investor’s 
legitimate expectation to benefit from support. Attempts by 
states to impose the major costs of climate policies on foreign 
investors could be considered to be discriminatory. Moreover, 
umbrella clauses could provide additional guarantees against 
breaches of contractual or regulatory commitments made to 
facilitate low-carbon investments. If the impact on investors’ 
rights and expectations is sufficiently serious, states could hardly 
justify reneging on their promises of support by advancing 
public policy objectives, such as budgetary constraints or short-
term economic harm. 
Arbitral tribunals have, however, followed diverging 
interpretations of the existing investment standards.221 This 
divergence results firstly from different formulations of 
investment standards in the IIAs applicable to the dispute. It also 
can be explained by the importance of the specific 
circumstances in each case.222 More importantly, investment 
arbitration does not know a doctrine of precedent.223 In 
accordance with Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention, an 
award is binding on the parties.224 Future arbitral tribunals can 
interpret the applicable IIA differently and apply it to the 
specific facts of the case according to their own appreciation.225 
The result is a “trend of diverging—and sometimes 
conflicting—awards,” as well as a “lack of coherence, consistency 
and predictability.”226 Low-carbon investors thus have no 
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certainty that arbitral tribunals will follow an interpretative 
approach that will adequately protect them against public 
interference with the financial and regulatory basis of their 
investments. The limits of the protection offered by existing IIAs 
raise the question of the necessity to create a specific investment 
regime for low-carbon investments. 
III. AN INVESTMENT REGIME FOR CLIMATE INVESTMENTS 
Analysts have identified a negative correlation between a 
state’s potential for GHG emission reductions and the quality of 
their investment climate.227 In a comparative study on the 
attractiveness of different countries as hosts for JI projects, 
Samuel Fankhauser and Lucia Lavric consider that: 
JI investors will face a clear trade-off between the scope for 
cheap JI on the one hand and the quality of JI institutions 
and the business environment on the other. The countries 
with the highest potential for cheap emission reductions 
also tend to be the countries with the most difficult 
investment climate.228 
This negative correlation can be explained by the fact that 
investment instability and unpredictability would deter the 
inflow of capital and the transfer of technology necessary to 
modernize and thus reduce the carbon intensity of the 
economy. In contrast, countries with a stable investment 
environment would attract private investments to contribute 
towards the modernization and improved energy efficiency of 
the state’s economy.229 There are less so-called “low-hanging 
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fruits” in terms of energy efficiency improvements and GHG 
emission reductions in these stable economies.230 
Kati Kulovesi, arguing along the same line, highlights the 
positive effect that a stable and secure investment climate has on 
the attractiveness of a country from an investor’s perspective for 
the implementation of the project-based mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol.231 Kulovesi considers that “[CDM and JI] 
projects tend to concentrate on the most advanced developed 
countries with conducive and secure investment 
environments.”232 These findings are supported by Sonja 
Peterson’s analysis, who determined that “[h]ost countries of 
CDM and JI projects are to date often those countries that also 
receive a significant proportion of total FDI flows.”233 
To improve the general investment climate for low-carbon 
investments, analysts have proposed the integration of 
investment protection rules in a post-2012 international 
agreement on climate change.234 Just like the Energy Charter 
Treaty, which aims to stimulate investments in the energy field 
by providing investment protection guarantees to private 
investors,235 the Kyoto Protocol could encompass an investment 
regime that would protect low-carbon investments against 
noncommercial risks.236 The International Institute for 
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Sustainable Development (“IISD”), for instance, defended the 
view that: 
The Kyoto Protocol . . . is an obvious candidate for the 
addition of investment rules designed to promote 
sustainable energy investment. IISD can foresee the climate 
change regime evolving, at least in part, into an investment 
regime, aimed at stimulating investment in technology 
renewal and industrial transformation with a view to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.237 
There are, however, nonnegligible barriers to the 
transformation of the Kyoto Protocol into a multilateral 
investment treaty. International climate negotiators are already 
confronted with the complex task of agreeing on the basic 
elements of a post-2012 regime, such as GHG emission cuts, 
monitoring procedures, and new financing mechanisms.238 
According to Edna Sussman, “[a] suggestion that these 
negotiators also address is the issue of how to craft an acceptable 
multi-lateral investment treaty that is simply not practical.”239 
Instead, Sussman argues that: 
[T]he ECT presents a readymade investment protection 
treaty already ratified by over fifty nations. It is this treaty 
that the developing nations should be urged to adopt as an 
important contribution on their part to arresting climate 
change, in the absence of GHG emission reduction caps 
binding on them.240 
It is true that many states characterized as having “low-
hanging fruits” in terms of GHG emission reductions are not 
contracting parties to the Energy Charter Treaty. Russia, for 
instance, has an enormous potential for GHG emission 
reductions241 and presents considerable opportunities for the 
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development of renewable energy sources.242 It signed the 
Energy Charter Treaty, but refused to ratify it.243 Future climate 
change mitigation and renewable energy investments in Russia, 
therefore, are not protected under the Energy Charter Treaty. 
In line with Sussman’s argument, there can be no doubt that 
Russia’s ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty or a similar 
multilateral energy treaty would considerably improve the 
investment climate for low-carbon projects. 
However, as Russia’s reluctance to endorse the Energy 
Charter Treaty illustrates, this treaty has proved to be 
particularly sensitive for energy-producing countries. Given 
relatively cheap access to energy resources, energy producers are 
often characterized by an energy and carbon intensity.244 These 
countries have an enormous potential for energy savings and 
GHG emission reductions. Advocating the adoption of the 
Energy Charter Treaty as a solution to the investment instability 
that affects low-carbon projects will therefore face resistance 
from some of the most relevant hosts of these projects. 
More importantly, the Energy Charter Treaty and existing 
IIAs in general do not provide low-carbon investors with a clear 
and certain guarantee of protection against the risks of 
interference by the state with the financial and regulatory basis 
of their investments. As analyzed above, existing investment 
protection standards theoretically could shield low-carbon 
investors from regulatory changes or ex post public 
interventions that represent a real threat to the financial viability 
of their investments. However, given diverging interpretations 
amongst the arbitral tribunals, there can be no absolute 
guarantee that the conditions underpinning climate change 
mitigation investments will be honored. 
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Accordingly, there appears to be a need to assure low-
carbon investors that arbitral tribunals will apply investment 
standards in a way that offers adequate protection against the 
specific risks that may affect their investments. The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s 2010 World 
Investment Report on Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy 
recommends: “Policy makers could devise IIA language that 
strengthens the role of IIAs in helping attract low-carbon 
foreign investment and encouraging the diffusion of relevant 
technology.”245 This could be done by fine-tuning the existing 
IIAs, for instance by means of common interpretative 
statements, or by integrating a specific low-carbon investment 
regime in a future international agreement on climate change. 
The creation of such a specific low-carbon investment 
regime will not require the negotiators to develop new 
investment disciplines. To improve the stability of the 
investment climate for low-carbon projects, it would suffice to 
crystallize the interpretation applied by certain arbitral tribunals 
on existing investment standards that already provide 
considerable protection against the risks that characterize 
climate policies. This could be done in the following ways: 
First, a low-carbon investment regime should officially 
endorse the qualification created by the Eureko tribunal of 
specific rights as “investments” that can be individually 
protected under international investment law. Given that under 
current market conditions the financial viability of low-carbon 
investments depends on public support, the right to receive this 
support constitutes “a key element of the investment, without 
which it appears that there would have been no investment at 
all.”246 This right has “some economic value.”247 It should 
therefore be entitled to individual investment protection. 
Substantial modifications to, or even withdrawal of, the support 
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that existed at the moment of investment should amount to 
measures tantamount to expropriation. Some support 
mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs for renewable energy, might 
not be capable of “independent economic exploitation” because 
of the impossibility to sell these support mechanisms 
independently from the underlying electricity transaction.248 
This could jeopardize the qualification of these rights as an 
individual investment and make it more difficult to rule that 
interference with this right constitutes an indirect 
expropriation. For this reason, the right to benefit from support 
for renewable energy and GHG emission reduction projects 
should be explicitly included in the definition of “investments” 
in IIAs. This definition could specify that low-carbon 
investments benefit from individual protection under the treaty, 
independently from the impact on the overall investment. The 
“unbundling” of property rights249 should be officially endorsed 
for low-carbon investments that base their business case on 
public support. 
Second, a specific low-carbon investment regime should 
adopt the interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard outlined by the Tecmed tribunal. This interpretation 
states that host states must “use the legal instruments that 
govern the actions of the investor or the investment in 
conformity with the function usually assigned to such 
instruments.”250 Building further on this approach, the fair and 
equitable treatment standard should guarantee to investors that 
host states will apply the mechanisms that they developed to 
induce investments in conformity with the ordinary use of these 
mechanisms. Ex post interference with support mechanisms, 
which prevent companies that invested in reliance on them from 
recovering their costs, contradicts the “function usually assigned 
to” these support mechanisms. 
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Third, in line with the arbitral award in Noble Ventures,251 the 
scope of umbrella clauses in a low-carbon investment regime 
should not be limited to contracts concluded by the central 
state, but should include undertakings made by separate public 
entities. Similarly, violations of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard by separate agencies should be attributable to the host 
state. Such a clarification of the application of the rules of 
attribution does not mean that the state would have to assume 
liability for every breach of “commercial” obligations by these 
separate entities. It would, however, ensure that, when 
regulatory tasks are delegated to separate entities, a violation by 
these entities of their obligations entails a violation of the 
investment treaty. Such a guarantee is particularly relevant in 
the context of the administration of support schemes for 
renewable energy. As illustrated by the European experience, 
states tend to delegate important regulatory tasks to separate 
entities in order to avoid the qualification of support schemes as 
state aid. By virtue of this delegation and of the nature of the 
delegated tasks, it can be said that these entities exercise 
sovereign competences. A violation of the undertakings taken 
on the basis of these competences should be attributable to the 
state. 
IV. THE CLIMATE LAW—INVESTMENT LAW SYNERGY  
The central importance of private investors to national and 
international climate change mitigation efforts necessitates the 
integration of their basic concerns in the regulatory initiatives 
developed to tackle climate change. The lack of internalization 
of the carbon externality is not the only obstacle to the 
development of low-carbon investments. The regulatory risks in 
the mechanisms that states create to internalize the carbon 
externality are as relevant to private investors. An efficient 
regulatory approach to climate change mitigation therefore 
must reflect and address investors’ concerns about regulatory 
stability and predictability.252 
Providing guarantees of regulatory stability and 
predictability is controversial because it involves a limitation of 
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states’ regulatory space. This limitation, by definition, is “a 
necessary corollary to the objective of creating an investment-
friendly climate.”253 If states want to increase the credibility of 
their political commitments, they must accept being bound by 
them in the future.254 
By signing and ratifying IIAs, states have recognized that 
regulatory stability and predictability influence investment 
decisions. They have accepted binding external constraints to 
attract foreign capital and technology. However, the limitation 
of states’ regulatory space is also one of the most contentious 
issues in the international investment law discipline. The 
literature repeatedly has stressed how binding investment 
obligations could affect a state’s regulatory space and policy 
liberty. Regarding climate change mitigation, commentators 
have warned that foreign investors in energy intensive 
installations could invoke investment protection standards 
against the implementation of national and international GHG 
emission reduction policies. They have criticized the effect of 
“regulatory chill” that investment arbitration would represent 
for states that intend to impose emission reductions, and have 
proposed ways to avoid investment arbitration clashing with 
climate policies. 
The focus on the potential constraining effect of 
investment arbitration has taken attention away from the 
potential positive contribution that investment law could make 
to combat climate change. Analyses on the interaction between 
investment law and climate change mitigation have been limited 
by a vision of foreign investors as polluters that aim to take 
advantage of, and even abuse, basic “rule of law” guarantees. 
Obsessed with the popular “mythology of ‘green communities’ 
opposed by ‘greedy and environmentally lax’ investors,”255 
analysts have largely ignored the fact that private capital and 
technology are indispensable to reorient the world economy 
towards more climate-friendly patterns. 
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Investment arbitration, as an “externally supported 
committed device,”256 has the potential to neutralize the risks 
that characterize low-carbon investments. It provides the 
conceptual tools that are necessary to complement the existing 
income-based approach with a risk-based approach. By doing so, 
it can reinforce the credibility, and thus effectiveness, of 
national and international climate policies. 
Climate law and investment law are complementary and 
mutually reinforcing. Both disciplines aim to promote 
investments by adopting a different approach. The fundamental 
objective of both is to attract private capital, especially of foreign 
origin, and to stimulate the transfer of technology to developing 
countries and economies in transition. To achieve this objective, 
climate law creates incentives to enable the financial viability of 
low-carbon investments. Investment law, on the other hand, 
aims to promote investment by protecting it against 
noncommercial risk. 
The complementary character of climate and investment 
law is not limited to the fact that they both aim to promote 
investment. It also results from the comparable principles that 
have been developed under climate and investment law to attain 
this objective. 
The principles of climate law and investment law are 
complementary first because of the central role of investors’ 
expectations in these two fields of law. Under climate law, 
support schemes for the promotion of low-carbon investments 
aim to attract investors on the basis of promises of support. 
States thus create expectations in reliance of which low-carbon 
investors commit capital and transfer technology. The 
international investment law principle of fair and equitable 
treatment, on the other hand, is directed at protecting foreign 
investors against eviscerations by states of the expectations they 
have created to attract investors. Climate law thus creates 
expectations, while investment law protects them. 
Second, the principles of climate law and investment law 
are complementary in the creation and protection of property 
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rights. On the one hand, support schemes for low-carbon 
investments entitle investors to additional financial revenues. 
These schemes create contractual and regulatory rights for 
investors to benefit from support during a certain period of 
time. On the other hand, the expropriation standard under 
international investment law protects investors against measures 
that destroy the economic value of investments, including 
contractual and regulatory rights. 
Third, both climate law and investment law recognize 
contractual relations between the state and investors as the 
foundation of investment decisions. Under climate law, 
contractual rights are created to facilitate the investment 
process. Under investment law, contractual rights are protected 
against state interference in order to guarantee the stability of 
investment conditions. 
Climate law and investment law are thus based on 
comparable principles that they approach from different 
perspectives. Climate law follows an income-based approach, 
while investment law adopts a risk-based focus. Climate law 
creates rights and expectations, while investment law aims to 
protect them. The creation and protection of investors’ 
expectations and rights can be seen as the logical corollary of 
the general objective of investment promotion that these two 
fields of law pursue. By providing a conceptual alternative to the 
current unilateral income-based approach in climate law, 
investment law has the potential to make a significant 
contribution to the national and international efforts at 
combating climate change. 
IIAs, however, are not environmental treaties.257 They are 
part of the context of globalization and economic liberalization, 
and are thus not directly designed to stimulate low-carbon 
investments.258 According to Thomas Wälde, most existing IIAs 
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focus on “traditional political risk.”259 They do not explicitly aim 
to address the specific risks that characterize low-carbon 
projects. 
The Nykomb case has highlighted the potential relief that 
investment law might offer to a low-carbon investor who is 
confronted with a regulatory change affecting the financial basis 
of his project. It is, however, not sufficiently representative to 
support the general conclusion that investment standards in 
existing IIAs, as interpreted in the current arbitral practice, 
provide adequate protection against the risks that can affect low-
carbon investments. In casu the violation of investment law was 
particularly blatant. The host state withdrew the support scheme 
for the foreign investor, while it continued to support domestic 
players. Low-carbon investors might yet face much subtler state 
interference with the public support commitments that 
underpin their investment decisions. The protection that 
existing IIAs might offer in these cases is less evident. While the 
interpretation of investment standards, by some arbitral 
tribunals, could force states to honor their promises of support, 
other less favorable approaches cannot be excluded. In the 
absence of a doctrine of precedent, investment arbitration 
provides no certainty to low-carbon investors that the financial 
and regulatory basis of their investment will be respected. 
However, it is precisely this certainty that is needed to 
facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy. Existing 
interpretations that provide adequate protection to low-carbon 
investments therefore should be officially endorsed in IIAs, or 
be integrated in a specific investment regime for low-carbon 
investments. 
CONCLUSION 
Investment arbitration has the potential to considerably 
limit the instability that currently affects the implementation of 
climate change mitigation policies. By limiting regulatory risks—
and thus risk premiums—for low-carbon investments, 
investment protection law can reduce the costs of the 
international GHG emission reduction efforts. The contribution 
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of investment arbitration to the improved regulatory certainty of 
low-carbon investments will, however, depend on the certainty 
of the arbitral process itself. The ongoing negotiations on the 
conclusion of a post-2012 international agreement on climate 
change provide a unique opportunity to address these investors’ 
concerns and create a special investment regime for low-carbon 
investments. 
